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A NEW ERA IN JUVENILE JUSTICE: EXPANDING
THE SCOPE OF JUVENILE PROTECTIONS
THROUGH NEUROPSYCHOLOGY
"The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults
do not disappear when an individual turns 18. ,1

I. INTRODUCTION
Given this premise asserted by the Supreme Court, why do the
constitutional protections for juveniles vanish on an individual's eighteenth
birthday? 2 The explanation articulated by the Second Circuit is that (1) a

line must be drawn to pronounce a categorical rule, and (2) eighteen is the
traditional age where society draws that line between adolescence and
adulthood. However, recent developments in neuropsychology have led
many to question the validity of such an arbitrary rule, especially as the

level of culpability between juveniles and adults continues to expand in the
courtroom.4

Over the past ten years, the Supreme Court delivered a series of
monumental decisions that redefined the constitutional limits on sentencing
juveniles.5 At the same time, neuroscience research exploded, offering new
insight into how the average brain develops into one's early to midtwenties.6 The combined impact of the Supreme Court's recent decisions
and neuropsychologists' findings on adolescent brain development sparked
1 Roper

v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (noting one's age not always indicative of

one's maturity level).
2 See id. at 575 (holding juveniles' age and maturity prohibits them from capital
punishment).
3 See United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 230-31 (2d Cir. 2013) (defining adulthood at
age eighteen).
4 See United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 507-08 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding juvenile
protections applicable to nineteen-year olds); see also infra Part II (identifying recent case law
with additional constitutional limits for sentencing juveniles).
5 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (prohibiting juveniles from capital punishment); Florida v.
Graham, 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010) (prohibiting juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses from
being sentenced to life in prison); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2465-66 (2012) (holding
juveniles cannot be sentenced to life in prison regardless of offense).
6 See infra Part III.A (illustrating recent developments in neuroscience and ongoing
investments by public and private entities).
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litigation over whether the same safeguards established by the Supreme
Court for juveniles should apply to individuals through early adulthood.7
The confluence of legal and scientific advancements in this area pose
difficult questions for policymakers and constitutional scholars over the
appropriate level of punishment for young adults, which could lead to a
turning point in the history ofjuvenile justice.8
This Note argues that the legal community must reexamine the
question of culpability as applied to young adults who satisfy the criteria
established by the Supreme Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller focusing
specifically on recent developments in neuropsychology. 9 Part II of this
note explores how juvenile justice evolved from feudal times to the present
and how contemporary scholarship in the field of psychology played a vital
role in each stage of judicial advancement.' 0 Part III outlines the recent
developments in neuropsychology and how these advancements were
critical to a district court reducing a nineteen year-old defendant's sentence
to half the statutory minimum, a decision subsequently overturned by the
Second Circuit." Part IV analyzes the most appropriate forum to develop
proper sentencing policy for young adults.12
II. PAST AND CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING
JUVENILE JUSTICE
A. The Evolution ofJuvenile Justice
The State's interest in differentiating between juveniles and adults
in administering justice can be traced back to the feudal era in England. 3
7 See infra Part III.B (presenting success and failure of this argument in federal courts); see
also infra note 81 (listing additional cases questioning safeguards for young adults).
See infra Part IV (proposing Sentencing Commission conduct comprehensive report on
appropriate judicial response moving forward).
9 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (holding mandatory life sentences without possibility of
parole unconstitutional for juvenile offenders); Graham, 560 U.S. at 81 (holding juveniles cannot
be sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide offenses); Roper, 543 U.S. at 556
(prohibiting death sentence for juveniles); see also C.R., 792 F. Supp. at 519-20 (extending
Court's rationale for juveniles to nineteen-year olds).
10 See infra Part II (illustrating evolution of juvenile justice in United States).
11 See infra Part III (demonstrating impact of neuroscience in recent court decisions).
12 See infra Part IV (presenting future methods in evaluating juvenile justice).
13 See HERBERT H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN AMERICA 3 (1927) (outlining juvenile justice

origins). As far back as the tenth century, Saxon King Athelstane attempted to reform juvenile
justice by enacting similar laws to our current juvenile courts, including probation. Id. at 13.
Besides this attempt, there is limited historical information as to the protections safeguarding
children throughout the Middle Ages. Id. However, evidence shows that severe punishments
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In 1772, Lord Jekyll in Eyre v. Shaftsbury declared "[t]he care of all infants
is lodged in the king as parens patriae
,14 This common law doctrine
that the State protects juveniles, along with the legal maxim that no person
can be found guilty of a crime without proof of a mens rea, sufficiently

concluded that a child under the age of seven was incapable of felonious
intent and should be placed in a separate category for determining
punishment.i5 Conversely, individuals between the ages of seven and
fourteen could be shown to have a guilty mind and were largely held to the
same standard as adults.i 6 These standards continued to evolve through the

turn of the twentieth century when progressive reformers confronted the
social injustices with respect to the treatment of juveniles, and thereby
implemented the first set of reforms in the modem treatment of juvenile
offenders, including the first juvenile court established in Chicago in
1899.17

The establishment of juvenile courts quickly spread throughout the

inflicted on children reached a climax in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Id. at 13-14
(referencing death sentences to children as young as eight and ten).
14 Id. at 3 (explaining common law doctrine's development in England). The common
law
doctrine of parenspatriae,the king is the father of his country, was the medieval illustration of
the modem view that the State has a primary interest in society as the guardian of social values.
Id.at 4.
15 See id.at 6 ("A child under seven years of age has been treated as being... incapable of
felonious intent."); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (holding children under age seven
incapable of felonious intent). Beyond age seven, children were "subjected to arrest, trial, and in
theory to punishment like adult offenders." In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16. An individual's guilt or
innocence is therefore dependent upon their psychological condition, which inevitably depends
partly on their age. See Lou, supra note 13, at 6 (developing history of juvenile justice).
16 See Kimberly Larson, Frank DiCataldo & Robert Kinscherff, Juveniles are
Different:
Miller v. Alabama: Implications for Forensic Mental Health Assessment at the Intersection of
Social Science and the Law, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRUvi. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 319, 320 (2013).
Prior to the twentieth century, the majority of individuals between the ages of seven and eighteen
were "adjudicated in the same system, governed by the same arrest and trial procedures, with the
same sentencing options available to courts hearing the cases of adult defendants." Id; see State
v. Guild, 10 N.J.L. 163, 190 (1828) (sentencing thirteen year-old boy to death for offense
committed when he was twelve).
17 See Lou, supra note 13, at 16-20 (discussing establishment of first juvenile court in the
United States). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, several states began adopting certain
laws to provide broader protections for juveniles. Id. at 16. For example, Boston enacted a law
in 1870, which required "separate hearings ... for the trial of the juvenile offender." Id. In
"recognizing the differences between youth and adults with regard to their lessened culpability
and greater amenability to rehabilitation and treatment," social reformers established the first
juvenile court. See Larson, DiCataldo & Kinscherff supra note 16, at 320-21. These juvenile
courts were not only separate legal proceedings, but were focused on rehabilitation rather than
punishment. Id. The reformers "envisioned a new system that would utilize the parenspatriae
power of the state to step in and assist youth in reforming their lives where, they felt, the child's
own parents had failed." Id.at 321.
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United States, and states began experimenting with their structure.' 8 In
1921, the United States Children's Bureau appointed a Committee
composed of fourteen judges, doctors, and other social policy experts to
develop Juvenile Court Standards.' 9
Among these standards, the
Committee recommended that the jurisdictional age limit for juvenile state
courts be no lower than eighteen.20 The Committee also recognized the
importance of another field gaining favor in the legal system as well as
mainstream society, that "[t]he judge should be chosen because of his
special qualifications ... legal training, acquaintance with social problems,
and understanding of child psychology.",21 The emergence of pediatric
psychology as a legally recognized discipline in the late nineteenth century
and early twentieth century played a tremendous role in the development of
juvenile courts, which were used as rehabilitation tools rather than simply

18 See Lou, supra note 13, at 22-25 (describing spread of juvenile court laws as "remarkably
rapid"); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 107 (1909) (discussing birth
of juvenile justice system). Within five years, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, New York, Maryland,
California, Missouri, New Jersey, Indiana, and Iowa passed juvenile court laws. See Lou, supra
note 13, at 22. More than twenty states and the District of Columbia created similar courts within
ten years. Id.at 24. Due to the pioneering nature of these courts, each state developed unique
ways to confront "new types of staff, new modes of preliminary procedure, of hearing, and of
detention... gathering facts... and new methods and facilities for making disposition of cases."
Id.at 25.
19 See James J. Davis & Grace Abbott, Juvenile Court Standards, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, CHILDREN'S BUREAU

(May 18, 1923), http://www.mchlibrary.info/history/chbu/20531-

1923.PDF (outlining Commission's findings and recommendations). The Committee worked on
these standards for two years and sent drafts to over 200 people including judges, probation
officers, officers of child-care agencies, and a number of others for feedback. Id. In its foreword,
the Committee summarized the principles of the juvenile standard to be: "(1) the court[s] dealing
with children should be clothed with broad jurisdiction... ; (2) the court should have a scientific
understanding of each child; (3) that treatment should be adapted to individual needs; (4) there
should be a presumption of keeping the child in his own home .... Id.at vi.
20 See id. at 2 (recommending anyone under eighteen fall within juvenile courts'
jurisdiction). According to the Committee, "[t]he age limit under which the court may obtain
jurisdiction in children's cases should be not lower than 18 years." Id. Furthermore, the
Committee noted that "j]urisdiction once obtained should continue until 21 years of age ......
Id. Although a number of states conformed with the 1921 report, many states continued to set
their own specific standards. See Lou, supra note 13, at 47 (indicating age range in most states to
be between sixteen and twenty-one). For instance, the jurisdictional age limit in Colorado is
eighteen but the court's jurisdiction is exclusive only up to sixteen years of age, allowing sixteen
year-olds to be tried in criminal courts. Id. at 51. Certain counties in Wisconsin, on the other
hand, hear cases of youths up to age twenty-one. Id.at 51-52.
21 Davis & Abbott, supra note 19, at 2 (emphasis added) (stating juvenile court judges'
qualifications); REYERSON, infra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining social views that
impacted juvenile justice). This emphasis on rehabilitation encouraged reformers to advocate for
a background in sociology and child psychology within the judiciary. See generally Davis &
Abbott, supra note 19, at 41-44.
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administering punishment.22
With the infusion of psychology and a renewed focus on

rehabilitation, juvenile court procedures became exceptionally informal and
provided judges with broad discretion in administering punishments.23
Several states continued to apply widely divergent techniques in these
proceedings until the mid-twentieth century when the U.S. Supreme Court
established constitutional protections that must be recognized by juvenile
24
courts. In Haley v. State of Ohio, Gallegos v. Colorado, and In re Gault.
Together, these cases changed the structure of juvenile courts, defining
formal due process protections. 2' After requiring procedural safeguards in
the 1960s, the Supreme Court was largely silent on the issue of juveniles'
due process ights for the next forty years, with few exceptions. 26
Following a wave of juvenile crime between the 1980s and 1990s,
22 ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 22-

26 (Hill & Wang 1978) (explaining social and philosophical views behind judicial reform). A
new school of criminology developed at the end of the nineteenth century fueling additional
social reforms. See id Experts in criminology and psychology began looking towards
environmental and economic factors shifting "[t]he view of the criminal as someone constrained
or guided in his moral choices by forces beyond his control [which] came to dominate the
thinking of period." Id. at 22. Juvenile court reformers adopted these views, arguing "the
fundamental purpose of juvenile court proceedings is not to determine whether or not a child has
committed a specific offense, but to discover whether he is in a condition requiring the special
care of the State ... " Id. at 43 (quoting 1920 survey of juvenile courts).
23 See Lou, supra note 13, at 71-74 (describing changes in juvenile sentencing procedures).
Judges bore the responsibility "to know the mind of the child in order to understand his point of
view [was] the first step toward the individualization of treatment." Id. at 73-74. Due to the
court's rehabilitative purpose, "procedures were informal and dispositions were indeterminate."
Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence D. Steinberg, Adolescence and the Regulation of Youth Crime, in
LESS GUILTY BY REASONS OF ADOLESCENT

33 (2008). A typical statute in the middle of the

twentieth century advised that "[t]he court may conduct the hearing in an informal manner and
may adopt any form of procedure in such cases which it deems best suited to ascertain the facts."
See Mack, supra note 18, at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1967) (holding juveniles have right to attorney
and other
protections afforded to adults); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962) (increasing
protections for juveniles in interrogation contexts); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948)
(stating fifteen-year olds do not fully appreciate reading of constitutional rights).
25 See Larson, DiCataldo & Kinscherff supra note 16, at 321-22 (explaining Supreme
Court's decision to establish formal due process rights for juveniles). Over the course of these
cases, the Supreme Court confronted the lack of formal protections created by juvenile courts.
See id For example, in Haley, the Court recognized that juveniles need counsel when being
brought into custody. Haley, 332 U.S. at 600 ("He needs counsel and .... [h]e needs someone
on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, may not crush him.").
"In both Gault and its predecessor Kent v. United States, the Court described a juvenile system
that had failed to realize its laudable goals and was meting out punishments just as harsh as those
in the adult system but without the protections afforded adults." Larson, supra note 16, at 322.
26 See Larson, DiCataldo & Kinscherff supra note 16, at 322 (discussing lack of Supreme
Court action following In re Gault).
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the United States saw public opinion of juveniles decline, which in turn led
to stronger penalties and harsher treatment towards juveniles in the
courtroom. 27 Due to the increasing social concerns, as well as a number of
developments in the field of psychology, the Supreme Court once again
confronted juveniles' constitutional protections, thus rekindling the
juvenile justice debate and embracing developments within
psychology and
28
neuropsychology to define a new era of juvenile justice.
B. Reliance on Psychology Pushes Court to Expand Constitutional
Protections
In its landmark case of Roper v. Simmons in 2005, the Supreme
Court held that juveniles cannot be considered the worst of society;
therefore, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the
death penalty on individuals under the age of eighteen. 0 The Court
defined three general differences between juveniles and adults: (1) lack of
maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility, (2) their susceptibility

27 See id at 322-23 (illustrating changes following rise in juvenile crimes); see also Mack,

supra note 18, at 33 (examining impact of violent crimes on social perception of juveniles). In
the 1990s, juveniles "were being transferred to the adult system more frequently, at younger ages,
for more offenses." Larson, DiCataldo & Kinscherff supra note 16, at 322-23. Additionally,
conservative politicians attacked rehabilitative reforms within the juvenile justice system as
failures. See Mack, supra note 18, at 33. Although the juvenile justice ideal of rehabilitation
may have come a long way since 1899, the description of wayward children who responded to the
sympathetic and caring juvenile courts "seemed to bear little relation to the reality of youth crime
in the late 2 0 'h century." Id.
28 See infra Part II.B (outlining most recent Supreme Court cases concerning juvenile
justice); see also Larson, DiCataldo & Kinscherff supra note 16, at 322-23 (discussing social and
political events leading up to Supreme Court decisions in past decade).
29 Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 511, 567-68 (2005)
30 See id. (holding juveniles' age and maturity prohibits them from receiving death penalty).
In Roper, the defendant was seventeen when he committed murder. Id. at 555. Nine months
following the murder, after he had turned eighteen, he was convicted and sentenced to death. Id.
To decide that the application of the death penalty to juveniles is unconstitutional, the Court
relied heavily on its decision in Atkins. See id.; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321
(2002) (concluding Eighth Amendment forbids mentally challenged individuals from capital
punishment). In Atkins, the Court held that because mentally challenged individuals "have
diminished capacities to understand and process information ... [and] learn from experience...
[t]here is abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated
plan .... Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do
diminish their personal culpability." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. The Court applied a similar
rationale in Roper, concluding that "once juveniles diminished culpability is recognized, it is
evident that neither of the two penological justifications for the death penalty retribution and
deterrence... provides adequate justification for imposing that penalty onjuveniles." Roper, 543
U.S. at 553 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to negative influences and peer pressure, and (3) their character is not as
well-formed. 3' By declaring that an individual should be given special
consideration in mitigation, due to their age and level of maturity, the Court
relied heavily on psychologists and opened the door for attorneys to begin
expanding this concept to individuals that may still be considered immature
but are over the age of eighteen.32
Five years following Roper's categorical decree, the Court

31

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570-72.

In support of the first two elements, the Court cited

behavioral studies focused on reckless adolescents. See id. at 569 (exploring external factors
affecting juveniles' decisions); see also Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW 339, 339 (1992) (emphasizing
statistics for reckless behavior in youths); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 23, at 1014 (arguing for
heightened vulnerability based on coercive circumstances). The third difference defined by the
Court focused on an internal struggle faced by juveniles. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (explaining
how juveniles struggle to define their identity). The Court acknowledged this struggle is
particular to adolescent years, and that as the individual matures, "a greater possibility exists that
a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed." Id. at 570. The Court did not reference any
neuropsychological support but the neuropsychological evidence found in two amici curioe
appears to have been persuasive in this third category. See id. Compare Kimberly D. Phillips,
Empathyfor Psychopaths: UsingJMRJ Brain Scans to Pleafor Leniency in Death Penalty Cases,
37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 14-19 (2012) (detailing how neuroimaging data used in defense
briefs was persuasive), with Stephen J. Morse, The Mind of a Child: The Relationship Between
Brain Development, Cognitive Functioning,andAccountability Under the Law: Brain Overclaim
Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 410
(2006) [hereinafter Mind of a Child] (arguing neuroscience evidence "largely irrelevant" to
Court's decision in Roper). Defense counsel briefs included research using magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) technology to examine the development of the brain over time. See Brief for the
American Psychological Association, et. al. Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447, at *9-13. The defendant's brief
illustrated how the frontal lobes of the brain, which play a critical role in higher-order cognitive
functions, continue to develop from ages seventeen to twenty-one. See id. The ability to capture
these images was the result of groundbreaking technology that had its skeptics in the early 1990s.
See Mind of a Child, supra, at 403 (describing recent technology's impact on understanding
juveniles). Although this innovative research was absent from the Court's opinion, it provided
compelling scientific evidence of why a juvenile's character is not well formed at age seventeen.
See id at 407-10.
32 See Mind of a Child, supra note 31, at 408 ("Roper has been the most important case to
propose use of the new neuroscience to affect responsibility...."). In evaluating the psychiatrists'
testimony regarding juveniles, the Court noted "[i]f trained psychiatrists with the advantage of
clinical testing and observation refrain . . . from assessing any juvenile under 18 as having
antisocial personality disorder, we conclude that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue
a far graver condemnation that ajuvenile offender merits the death penalty." Roper, 543 U.S. at
573. Besides its impact on the law, Roper gained public attention as editorial pages began
encouraging the Court's use of neuroscientific evidence. See Mind of a Child, supra note 31, at
408. (discussing how such evidence points to behavioral differences).
Along with the
psychological and sociological differences, the Court also acknowledged the influence of
international opinion on prohibiting the death penalty to juveniles. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-79
("In sum, it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face
against the juvenile death penalty.").
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expanded the rule to prohibit juveniles from being sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole for non-homicide offenses in
Graham.33 The Graham Court directly referred to the "nature of juveniles"
outlined in Roper as support for why juveniles should not be sentenced to
prison without parole; but in this case, the Court explicitly cited
neuroscientific evidence as support.3 4 The Graham Court discussed the
petitioner's brief on how developments in "brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds .... [and that]
parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through
late adolescence. "315 Following Graham, the Eighth Amendment now
protected juveniles outside the scope of capital punishment, and the Court
demonstrated
further
confidence
in
citing
psychology
and
neuropsychological evidence to support the differences between juveniles
and adults.36
Finally, in Miller v. Alabama the Supreme Court prohibited a
sentence of life in prison without the possibility for parole for a juvenile
convicted of homicide.3 7 Again, the Court emphasized that as a child
matures and "neurological development occurs, his deficiencies will be

33 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81-82 (2010) (expanding Court's rule inRoper to exclude
life sentences for non-homicide offenses). In Graham, the trial court adjudicated a sixteen yearold defendant of armed robbery and a series of other charges and sentenced him to life in prison
without parole. Id. at 48. Because Florida abolished its parole system, the defendant had no
possibility of release. Id. In considering the defendant's age and its recent decision in Roper, the
Court expanded the reach of the Eighth Amendment to prohibit "a juvenile offender to be
sentenced to life in prison without parole for a nonhomicide crime." Id.
34 See id. at 68 (citing Supreme Court's language in Roper as guidance); infra note 37 and
accompanying text (quoting Supreme Court's application of neuroscience evidence).
31 Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (citing neuroscientific evidence to show differences between
juveniles and adults); see Jason Zolle, Commentary, Transforming Juvenile Justice: Making
Doctrine Out of Dicta in Graham v. Florida, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 30, 31
(2013) (suggesting Graham requires criminal proceedings to consider youthful status of juveniles
in sentencing). Based on this evidence, the Court inferred that "juveniles are more capable of
change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of irretrievably depraved
character than are the actions of adults." Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks

omitted).
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (referencing Court's use of psychological
and neuropsychological evidence in expanding juvenile protections).
37 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464-65 (2012) (expanding juvenile protections
established in Graham). In Miller, the Court considered the constitutionality of a fourteen yearold's mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for a murder conviction. Id. at
2457. In a controversial 5-4 decision, the Court expanded the principle in Graham, and
concluded that the Eighth Amendment "forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison
without possibility of parole for juvenile [homicide] offenders." Id. at 2469 (quoting Graham v.
Virginia, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
36
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In a footnote, the Court references the amount of evidence it

received by the parties indicating that "the science and social science
supporting Roper's and Graham's conclusions have become even
stronger."39 These three cases demonstrate the Court's continuing trend of

limiting juveniles' culpability due to their limited level of maturityGraham and Miller illustrate the Court's use of neuropsychology in
40
supporting their position.
III. NEUROPSYCHOLOGY'S IMPACT ON A CATEGORICAL RULE
A. Changing the Concepts of Culpability through Neuroscience
The application of psychology to juvenile justice has enabled
society and the legal community to examine the particular individual on
trial. 41 Today, there remains an open question over how developments in
neuroscience can push the analysis a step further by evaluating specific
defendants and age echelons as a whole at a biological level using
structural and functional images of the brain.42
This evaluation is
commonly referred to as cognitive neuroscience, a field "that seeks to
understand how the mind arises from the central nervous system.
.[bridging] the fields of cognitive science, psychology, and biology by
focusing on the biological mechanisms underlying cognition, with a
specific focus on the neural substrates of mental processes and their
Id. at 2465 (internal quotation marks omitted) (applying Court's use of neuroscience in
Graham to Miller). In Graham, the Court also referenced how the qualities of youth, "transient
rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences [decrease] a child's 'moral
culpability." Id.
31 See id.
at 2455, n.5 (quoting two briefs on psychology, neuropsychology, and sociology).
The Court quotes one brief, relying on "developmental psychology and neuroscience," as
confirmation of the validity of the Court's conclusions. Id. (quoting Brief for American
38

Psychological Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae inSupport of Petitioner, Miller v.Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2465 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 174239). In giving credence to the

neuroscience evidence, the Court also suggested approval of defendant's brief by quoting "[ilt is
increasingly clear that adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions and systems related to
higher-order executive functions such as impulse control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance."
See id.

40 See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text (illustrating trend of expanding juvenile
protections through neuroscience evidence).
41 See supra Part II.B (explaining evolution and impact of psychology in the courtroom).
42 See Steven K. Erickson, Neuroscience: Blaming the Brain, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 27,

35 (2010) (explaining birth of neurolaw). NeuroLaw, coined by attorney J. Sherrod Taylor,
describes the convergence of neuropsychology and the law. Id.Initially, neuropsychology was
used as expert testimony in brain-injury civil suits in order to obtain financial rewards, but it has
started to impact other areas of the law. See id.
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behavioral manifestations., 43 The ability of scientists to investigate the
structure and functioning of brain activity was greatly enhanced in the
1990s through functional magnetic resonance imaging (AMRI)
technology.44 In order to understand behavior, cognitive neuroscientists
use the activity observed in fMRI data to help explain the individual's
thought process, leading to particular actions.45
Over the past few years, neuroscientists have made progress in
understanding the adolescent brain.46 For instance, they have proven that
,many psychiatric disorders, once thought or assumed to be the result of
environmental or social factors, are the result of differences in brain
structure or function., 47 They also proved, based on the neurological data
alone, that child and adolescents brain activity are both structurally and
functionally different from adults.48

43 Id. at 42. The premise behind cognitive science is that all thoughts, ideas, feelings, and

emotions can be measured by studying the biology of the brain. See id These measurements can
then be used in creating models to understand mental activity and predict future behavior. Id.
44 See id. at 42-44. Similar to structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), fMvIRI utilizes a
powerful magnetic field to affect water molecules within cells; however, MRI data is only
accessible after a person's death through an autopsy, while fMRI claims to provide these results
during the person's life. Id. at 43. Neuroscientists believe that "understanding the complexity of
mentation is possible by reducing the operation of the brain to multiple quasi-independent
cognitive modules" which can be seen in fMRI data. Id. at 44. FMIRI technology "creates threedimensional color images, depicting 'fluctuations in oxygen concentrations' in particular regions
of the brain. By indirectly measuring local changes in brain activity, 'fMRI can aid in determining
which regions of the brain are recruited in particular cognitive or perceptual tasks." See Sydney
B. Roth, Comment, The Emergence of NeuroscienceEvidence in Louisiana, 87 TUL. L. REv. 197,
204 (2012).
45 See Erikson, supra note 42, at 45-46 (explaining link between brain activity and behavior).
In order to assert these claims, neuroscientists must assume that complex human thought can be
reduced to isolated modules found in particular areas of the brain, and employ experiments that
manipulate those areas. See id. "Determining which areas of the brain are responsible for such
higher-ordered, and presumably uniquely human mentation, is largely a matter of reliance on
three factors: (1) anecdotal evidence from brain injury victims, (2) observations of people under
the effects of psychoactive chemicals, (3) and highly-contrived experiments conducted within the
confines of fMRI laboratories." Id. at 46.
46 See Carl Zimmer, Secrets of the Brain: New Technologies are Shedding Light on Biology's
Greatest Unsolved Mystery: How the Brain Really Works, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 2014), at
28-57 (explaining recent innovations in neuroscience). As neuroscientists are able to manipulate
the information uncovered through fIMRI, they are able to observe flaws in the brain identifying
"differences in the structure of ordinary brains and brains of people with disorders such as
schizophrenia, autism, and Alzheimer's disease." Id. at 38.
47 See Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and the Law:
A Role in
Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321, 331 (2006) (identifying new discoveries through
neuroscience).
48 See id. ("[R]ecent investigations provide evidence that brain maturation continues well
past adolescence.").
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These recent advancements in understanding the brain have led to a
surge of academic research in this field, leading to what the National
Geographic referred to as "one of the great scientific revolutions of our
time., 49 The United States government has contributed to these efforts by
funding a large-scale project to map the neural circuitry of the brain under
the Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnology
(BRAIN) Initiative.50
President Obama has publicly endorsed this
initiative, referring to it as "the next great American project" and vowed to
give "scientists the tools they need to get a dynamic picture of the brain in
action."'" Paul Allen, co-founder of Microsoft, founded the Allen Institute
for Brain Science in 2003 to accelerate the understanding of the human
brain and to map the brain's molecular machinery.5 2 These public and
private projects illustrate the broad societal interest in exploring and
understanding the inner workings of the brain.53
49 See Zimmer, supra note 46, at 36 (discussing massive interest and resources pushed
towards neuroscience research).
50 See John Markoff, Obama Seeking to Boost Study of Human Brain, N.Y. TIMES (February

17, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/science/project-seeks-to-build-mapof-human-brain.html?pagewanted all&module Search&mabReward-relbias%3 As& r(explaining goals behind initiative). In his 2013 State of the Union, President Obama announced,
"scientists are mapping the human brain to . . . unlock the answers to Alzheimer's. They're
developing drugs to regenerate damaged organs .... Now is not the time to gut these job -creating
investments in science and innovation." Id.
51 Zimmer, supra note 46, at 38 (quoting President Obama's support for the BRAIN
initiative); see William J. Broad, Billionaireswith Big Ideas are PrivatizingAmerican Science,
N.Y.
TIMEs
(Mar.
15,
2014),
available
at,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/science/billionaires-with-big-ideas-are-privatizingamerican-science.htil (quoting President Obama on BRAIN initiative). President Obama has
pledged $100 million in federal funds for this project. Broad, supra.
52 See Zimmer, supra note 46, at 42 (explaining private investment in neuroscience
research);
see
also
Founders,
ALLEN
INST.
FOR
BRAIN
SCIENCE,
http://www.alleninstitute.org/our-institute/founders/ (explaining history and purpose behind Allen
Institute for Brain Science). In addition to Paul Allen donating $500 million to this cause through
the Allen Institute, other private investors are getting involved. See Zimmer, supra note 46, at 42.
For example, technology and real estate billionaire Fred Kavli established brain institutes at Yale,
Columbia, and the University of California. See id. (illustrating extent of private investments in
brain research).
53 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (demonstrating recent governmental and
private investments in brain research). These initiatives are not limited to academic and medical
discovery. See Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the
Emerging Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 352, 357 (2010) (reporting growth of
neuroscience and legal scholarship). In 2007, the MacArthur foundation invested $10 million to
begin the Law and Neuroscience Project. See id. The intersection of neuroscience and the law
has appeared on the cover of Time Magazine and was identified "by the preeminent scientific
journal Science as one of the top seven topics to watch in 2009." Id. at 358; see THE
MACARTHUR
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Although recent advancements in neuroscience may offer a
gateway to understanding the inner workings of the brain, neuroscience as
a field is still in its infancy and some remain skeptical of the validity both
of its conclusions and practical application in the courtroom.54 Stephen
Morse, the associate director at the Center for Neuroscience and Society at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School argues, "at present,
neuroscience has little to contribute to more just and accurate criminal law
decision-making about policy, doctrine,
and individual
case
adjudication., 55 The jury is still out on whether the neuroscience evidence
at present is sufficient to question long held beliefs in the legal system; but
there is no question that the more highly developed and robust the
neuroscience literature becomes, the more lawyers will make compelling
arguments forcing courts to confront increasingly difficult questions.5 6
B. Blurring the Legal Line Between Juveniles and Adults
The Court's emphasis on concepts supporting leniency for
juveniles introduced in Roper, and expanded on in Graham and Miller,
have allowed lawyers to argue that those principles should apply to
individuals in early adulthood.5 7 In United States v. C.R., the U.S. District
advancements in neurolaw).
54 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phanm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (evaluating expert
scientific testimony's applicability in the courtroom); Stephen J. Morse, NeuroLawExuberance:A
Pleafor Neuromodesty, in TECHNOLOGIES ON THE STAND: LEGAL AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS IN

23, 32 (Bibi van den Berg & Laura Kleming eds., 2011)
[hereinafter A Plea] (claiming irrational exuberance regarding neuroscience on law). In the
absence of additional science, fMRI imposes two major assumptions: "[flirst, since there are no
definitive or universal rules about how the brain becomes the mind, fMRI utilizes technologically
convenient assumptions about brain function to arrive at its end product. Second, there are no
alternative mechanisms equivalent to autopsy dissection to validate the findings of fMRI."
Erickson, supra note 42, at 43-44.
55 See Mind ofa Child, supra note 31, at 39. According to Morse, "[p]olicy and adjudication
should not be influenced by findings that are insufficiently established and replications of
findings are crucial to our confidence in a result." Id. at 33. However, Morse acknowledges the
potential for the future of neuroscience, stating that "as the philosophy of mind and action and
neuroscience mutually mature and inform each other, neuroscience will help us understand
criminal behavior." Id. at 39.
56 See Roth, supra note 44, at 202; see also State v. Stanko, 658 S.E.2d. 94, 97-98 (S.C.
2008) (introducing PET and Brain Morphological Analysis evidence to establish issues of guilt,
innocence, and psychopathy). Due to the rapid "advances in the field of neuroscience, scientists
are now able to provide better explanations for the biological mechanisms responsible for...
emotions, decision making, violence and aggression, mental capacity, mental illness, and a host
of other behaviors and subjective mental states that were once only appreciated through esoteric
theorizing." Roth, supra note 44, at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57 See supra Part II.B (explaining rationale behind Court's decisions in Roper, Graham, and
NEUROSCIENCE AND ROBOTICS
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Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced a nineteen year-old
defendant to half the statutory minimum after pleading guilty to receiving
and distributing child pornography on the Internet. 58 The district court's
decision was largely dependent on the Supreme Court's rationale in
Graham, holding that a term of five years in federal prison under the
sentencing requirements for this particular defendant would constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.5 9
In deciding to cut the statutory minimum in half, the district court
heard from a number of experts, evaluated psychological, behavioral, and
neuropsychological evidence, and even visited the Federal Medical Center,

Miller); see also infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (explaining district court's application
of Eighth Amendment to nineteen year-olds).
58 United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 519-20 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding five-year
mandatory minimum sentence to be unconstitutional). Although the Supreme Court's rationale
was initially presented in Roper, the district court in C.R. focused on Graham because the
defendant in Roper was facing the death penalty. See id. It is also important to point out that
Miller had not been decided at the time of C.R. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)
(prohibiting juvenile sentence to life in prison without parole for murder conviction). In C.R., the
defendant was introduced to child pornography at age fifteen. See C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d at 347.
Over the next three years, he "collected more than a thousand child pornographic still images and
over a hundred such videos, in addition to substantial adult pornography." Id. at 350-51. The
defendant was nineteen at the time of the offense and pled guilty to distributing a video that
contained child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). See id. at 347 (requiring
sentence based on statutory minimum of five years). The court ultimately imposed a thirty-month
sentence for intensive medical treatment while in prison, followed by a long-term curative
therapy and many years probation. Id. at 347-48.
59 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (acknowledging immaturity as factor in
sentencing); C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d. at 496 (relying on defendant's age and immaturity in
mitigation). The district court held that
testimony and other evidence at [the defendant's] sentencing hearing as well as
consensus and other ruling criteria supports the conclusion that at the time of the crime
he was, and should be characterized for sentencing as, a developmentally immature
young adult with limited ability to appreciate legal limits on contacts with child
pornography and to control his viewing of easily accessible internet programs.
C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d. at 506. Relying heavily on the Supreme Court's distinction between the
culpability of juveniles and adults in Graham, the court found the minimum statutory sentence
grossly disproportionate, and thus violated the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 496 ("The Graham
court went on to explain that '[a] juvenile is not absolved of responsibility for his actions, but his
transgression 'is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult..."). The C.R. court also points
out how the statutory minimum guidelines for possession and distribution of child pornography
vary among states, but on average are much less harsh than the five years imposed by the federal
sentencing guidelines. Id. at 493. A large proportion of federal judges view the sentencing
guidelines for possession and receipt of child pornography as unreasonably harsh. Id. at 481; see
injra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining Sentencing Commission's report on
controversies surrounding harsh child pornography sentences).
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before ultimately deciding the nineteen year-old defendant's sentence.60
The district court's first line of scientific support for the immaturity
exception cites "[p]sychology and brain imaging studies" to demonstrate
the importance of neuroscience in uncovering the fundamental differences
between "adolescents and adult minds. ''6i Dr. William Barr conducted a
neuropsychological test to "obtain a comprehensive profile of [the
defendant's] current cognitive functioning," concluding there was "no
62
inherent defect inhibiting him from success in a community setting.,
Along with Dr. Barr's report, Dr. Laurence Steinberg presented general
63
scientific principles of brain development to the defendant's situation.
Dr. Steinberg's testimony fully corroborated the neuroscience reports that
were used by the Supreme Court in Roper and Graham, but in this case he
was testifying as to how these biological changes are still occurring in a
nineteen year-old. 64 Along with the district court's references to Roper and
60

See C.R., 792 F.Supp.2d at 496-07 (highlighting court's expansive use of expert

testimony). The district court included the defendant's mental health evaluations that were
conducted following his arrest at the direction of Pre-trial Services. Id.at 408-18.
61 Id. at 497 (providing scientific information supporting immaturity exception). The
court
cites briefs presented to the Supreme Court in Graham that "[sltructural differences between
adolescent and adult brains, confirmed by recently developed brain inagery technology,
demonstrate that critical regions of the brain ...
continue to develop through age 25." Id. at 499;
see supra notes 33-Error! Bookmark not defined, and accompanying text (explaining Court's
use of neuroscience evidence in Graham).
62 C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d at 412-15 (comparing defendant's cognitive functioning to what
is
considered normal). Dr. Barr's evaluation indicated that the defendant's "level of intellectual
functioning is in the 'high average' range." Id. at 412 (concluding defendant is no different than a
typical nineteen-year old). In fact, Dr. Barr testified, "t]here is also no evidence from the current
testing or past records to indicate that, at the time of the alleged offenses, [the defendant] differed
from any other males from his age group in terms of his decision-making capacity or in his ability
to control impulses." Id. at 413 (demonstrating defendant was not unique from neurological
standpoint).
63 See id. at 502 (testifying to general principles accepted within neuroscience).
Dr.
Laurence Steinberg was the chief scientist for the American Psychological Association, helping
the Association's counsel prepare the amicus briefs in Roper and Graham. Id. In acknowledging
consensus within the neuroscience community, Dr. Steinberg stated, "we know that there's
structural brain change after the age of 18 both in gray matter and in white matter, and we also
know that there's function in the brain after 18 in terms of differences in patterns of brain activity
that you see among people of different ages." Id. at 503. Dr. Steinberg explicitly disagreed with
Dr. Barr's assessment that there is a cutoff period of adolescence at age eighteen. Id. at 502-03.
64 See id at 503-04 ("[R]egions of the brain that are important for things like thinking ahead
and planning and impulse control and weighing risks and rewards, those regions and systems of
the brain are still developing after age 19."). In fact, based on his research, Dr. Steinberg
explained how the characteristics of the executive functions of the brain, specifically "impulse
control," are still developing into the mid-twenties. See id at 504. Therefore, "a cognitively
normal 19-year-old would be more apt to behave impulsively than a typical 25-year-old, let's say,
as a point of comparison." Id. Steinberg continued describing what his research has shown and
even includes how his research supports psychologists and sociologists Age Crime Curve theory.
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Graham for support, it took the Supreme Court's decisions a step further by
concluding that based upon the scientific evidence presented, the Eighth
65
Amendment provides protections to individuals over the age of eighteen.
The government appealed the district court's decision and the
Second Circuit provided a much different perspective on Roper and
Graham's application to the case. 66 The Second Circuit emphasized that
the defendant was already nineteen when he committed the crime;
therefore, "he was an adult, not a juvenile.
It further expounded that the
Supreme Court's decision in Roper and Graham concerned juveniles; the
district court's attempt to "blur the distinction between juvenile and adult

offenders" does not make a nineteen year-old a juvenile simply because he
is "developmentally immature. 6 8 Although the Second Circuit devoted the
majority of its opinion to discussing the rigid application of mandatory

minimums, it noted "immaturity, unlike age, is a subjective criterion, ill-

See id.at 505 ("The Age Crime Curve ... shows that misbehavior of almost every sort increases
from age 10 or so on and peaks around 17 or 18 and then declines.... [i]t's likely to be the case
that decline is related to improvements in self-regulation and in the maturation of self-control.").
Steinberg supports his psychosocial observations with neurological evidence, inferring that the
increase of impulse control and weighing future consequences as an individual's age is due to
"maturation of the prefrontal lobe both in synaptic pruning and myelination and the development
of stronger connections between cortical and subcortical regions." See id.at 505-06.
65 See id.at 497.
After considering the entirety of expert testimony, the district court
concluded, "[w]hile 18 may be the point where society draws the line for many purposes between
childhood and adulthood, scientific developments conclude that full adulthood is not biologically
achieved until much later in life than age 18." Id. at 497 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, the court notes that the defendant committed the crimes "during a state of adolescent
development that neuropsychological research has found to have significant implications for
insight, decision making, judgment, risk taking behavior, and, ultimately, culpability. This
research weighs heavily in the court's determination that the five-year mandatory minimum
sentence is unconstitutional as applied." Id. at 507 (concluding five-year mandatory minimum
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment).
66 United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 230-31 (2d Cir. 2013) (reversing district court's
decision in favor of mandatory minimum).
67 See id.
at 215 (pointing solely to defendant's age to assign him adult status). The Second
Circuit easily distinguished this case from the Supreme Court's decisions in Roper and Graham
because unlike those cases, the defendant was nineteen years-old at the time of the alleged
offense. See id.(imposing mandatory minimum five-year sentence given legal adult status); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (2012) (defining mandatory five-year minimum sentence for
knowingly receiving or distributing child pornography).
68 Reingold, 731 F.3d at 215 (discussing district court's misapplication of Roper and
Graham). The Second Circuit asserts "the Court used [age 18] to distinguish the class of
offenders that categorically could not be sentenced to death from others to whom no such
categorical prohibition would apply." Id. Therefore, if the Court wished to extend the impact of
Graham and Roper to individuals over the age of eighteen, it would not have used the term
juveniles. Id.
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suited to the pronouncement of categorical rules. 6 9 In considering the
district court's rationale and the Supreme Court's guidance on sentencing
juveniles, the Second Circuit concluded that although the defendant may
not have been a fully developed adult, "a line must be drawn to pronounce
a categorical rule . . . because [t]he age of 18 is the point where society
draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood ... the
district court could not substitute the defendant's relative immaturity for
[his] actual age.",70 The Second Circuit's ultimate conclusion, preferring
the age where society has drawn the line between juveniles and adults over
the criteria presented by psychologists and neuropsychologists, may
encourage the legal community to consider this question and potentially
open the door for reevaluating the most appropriate guidelines in
sentencing individuals that have recently entered adulthood. 7'
IV. SENTENCING POLICY FOR YOUNG ADULTS IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY
Sentencing policy for individuals under eighteen years old has
come a long way in the past century due to social initiatives and

69

See id. at 215-21 (discussing amount of deference given to legislature in defining

mandatory minimums). Due to each sentence being "a function of both the crime committed and
the character of the defendant who committed it, Congress decided ... the distribution of child
pornography was a sufficiently serious crime as to require at least a five-year sentence even for
the most sympathetic defendant." Id. at 220. In fact, the Second Circuit includes a lengthy
discussion on why a five-year minimum sentence is appropriate for conviction of this offense. See
id. at 218-30 (noting difficulty in preventing child pornography). In 2003, Congress established a
five-year minimum prison term for knowing receipt or distribution of child pornography with the
objective of drying up this market through severe criminal penalties. Id. at 218-19. In evaluating
mandatory minimums defined by Congress, the Supreme Court has stated that it "never
invalidated a penalty mandated by a legislature based only on the length of sentence . . . we
should only do so in the most extreme circumstance." Id. at 220 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 1006 (1991)). Although "[a]n adult defendant's immaturity may mitigate his moral
culpability . . . it does not reduce the harmful effects of his crime." Id. at 221. The Second
Circuit also points to the Supreme Court's guidance in Harmeirn v. Michigan, holding that the
Eighth Amendment's proportionality analysis should be "informed by objective factors to the
maximum possible extent." Id. at 215; see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991)
(applying Eighth Amendment's proportionality review).
70 Reingold, 731 F.3d at 215 (internal quotation marks omitted) (defining traditional standard
applied for differentiating between juveniles and adults). The Second Circuit highlighted the fact
that the experts that testified in the evidentiary hearing seemed to contradict each other. See id.
("Nowhere does the record reveal any consensus about how immature adults should be sentenced
for child pornography crimes.").
71 See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (presenting district and circuit court
arguments).
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advancements in psychology.7 2 With rapid expansions and complements in
neuropsychology, has the field of psychology progressed to a level where it
can redefine the legal distinction between juveniles and adults? 73 The
district court's decision to sentence a nineteen-year old below the mandated
minimum appears premature when taking into account the relatively new
developments in neuropsychology. 4
On the other hand, the Second
Circuit's decision fails to adequately address the hundred pages of expert
testimony of psychologists and neuropsychologists included in the district
court's opinion detailing actual developments in those fields. 75 The
question the legal community must ask itself is how these recent
developments in neuropsychology should be applied to the legal system in
finding the most appropriate distinction between sentencing juveniles and

adults .76
A. Should the Supreme Court Decide United States v. Reingold?
In the unlikely event the Supreme Court grants certiorari to US. v.
72

See supra Part II (detailing developments in juvenile justice over past one hundred years).

73 See supra Part III (discussing current state of neuropsychology and its potential impact on

juvenile justice).
74 See supra Part III.A (discussing current state of neuropsychology). The breakthrough
advancements in neuroscience, specifically the ability to evaluate brain activity through fMRI,
were only developed within the past twenty-years. See supra notes 42-Error! Bookmark not
defined, and accompanying text (explaining recent progress in neuroscience through tMRI).
75 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's rejection of
subjective nature of immaturity in favor of categorical rules); see also United States v. C.R., 792
F. Supp. 2d 343, 408-508 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (recording hundred pages of psychologist and
neuropsychologist testimony). Although the Second Circuit acknowledges the district court's
argument, it appears to reject the scientific evidence due to its complex and problematic
application, favoring "[tihe age of 18 [because it] is the point where society draws the line for
many purposes between childhood and adulthood." See Reingold, 731 F.3d at 215 (2013)
(preferring society's definition of adult over expert testimony).
71 See infra Part IV.B. The issue of expanding the arguments in Roper and Graham has
already been raised in other jurisdictions. See Wilcox v. Rozum, No. 13-3761, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 179479 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2013) (arguing for application of principles in Miller to
eighteen-year old); Ocampo v. Fisher, No. 13-3569, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150153 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 23, 2013) (arguing life sentence violates Eighth Amendment rights of eighteen-year olds
after Miller). In Wilcox v. Rozum, the defendant was given a mandatory life sentence after being
convicted of second-degree murder seven months after his eighteenth birthday. Wilcox, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179479, at *3. In a writ of habeaus corpus, the petitioner argued "although
Miller v. Alabama dealt specifically with defendants who were under the age of eighteen... the
decision should apply to any individual who was between the ages of eighteen and twentyfive... because the decision shows that a child's biological process is not typically complete until
he reaches his mid-twenties." Id. In each of these cases, the court has ruled that the principles
outlined in Roper, Graham, and Miller only apply to individuals under the age of eighteen. See
id. at *34; Ocampo, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *8-9.
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Reingold, there is little doubt that it would affirm the decision of the
Second Circuit. 77 The district court's decision that sentencing the
defendant to five-years in federal prison would constitute cruel and unusual
punishment is unlikely to persuade the Supreme Court to go outside the
mandatory minimum for two reasons: (1) although the facts of this case are
unique, there is nothing specific to the defendant's fMRI scans or
neurological data that proves he is less mature than the average person; and
(2) neuropsychologists seem to lack universal consensus on what precisely
defines the maturity level of a nineteen-year old.78 With respect to the first
point, the most influential testimony in United States v. C.R. pertained to
the general neuroscience information suggesting that the brain is still
maturing for most of the population, between the ages of eighteen to
twenty-five .79 The defendant demonstrated no signs of immaturity in terms
of brain development; therefore, the impact of this decision would likely
establish a precedent questioning the level of culpability between juveniles
and adults for any crime; the immediate result of which would be opening
the doors to endless litigation for anyone under the age of twenty-five to
argue that they should not be considered an adult for sentencing purposes.0
Further, the Supreme Court is unlikely to accept the district court's
argument is that neuroscience is still a relatively young field and has yet to
be meaningfully considered as an impetus for systematic change in the

77 See infra notes 83-90 (outlining reasons Supreme Court would not grant Reingold
certiorari). Congressionally approved mandatory minimums are controversial throughout the
legal community because of the deference they are given by appellate courts. See supra notes 7374 (explaining strict enforcement of mandatory minimums); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 290 (1983) ("Reviewing courts... should grant substantial deference to the broad authority

that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for
crime.").
78 See Zimmer, supra note 46 (comparing defendant's cognitive functioning with average
person's brain); see also Gruber, supra note 47, 95 (discussing disagreement between two
neurologists testifying at defendant's sentencing hearing).
79 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing general principles accepted in
neuroscience). During the sentencing hearing, Dr. Barr concluded "[t]here is no evidence from
objective testing or available records to indicate any underlying neuropsychological deficit or

weakness in impulse control, decision-making, or planning relative to others in [defendant's] age
group that would have affected his behavior at the time of the alleged sexual offenses." United
States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 414. Dr. Steinberg did not specifically evaluate the
defendant, but rather was asked to testify to "general scientific principles of adolescent brain
development." Id. at 502.
80 See supra note 76 (explaining attorneys' attempts to extend the Court's ruling in Roper,
Graham, and Miller). Expanding the Eighth Amendment under these circumstances would have
broad implications because the district court's decision was not focused on the particular
circumstances surrounding the defendant's maturity level, rather it was on the average person
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
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legal system.8 ' Such a revolutionary concept needs to be thoroughly
evaluated and clearly defined before the Supreme Court would make a
decision that departs from congressionally defined mandatory minimums
and challenges the long established practice of sentencing an eighteen-year
old as an adult.8 2 However, this is not to say that questioning the
distinction between juveniles and adults through scientific research lacks
merit; in fact, over the past few years neuroscience has made rapid
developments and begun playing a more central role in how courts evaluate
human behavior.83 Although a Supreme Court ruling may not be the
appropriate mechanism to define new standards based on the particular
facts of Reingold, the question is still left unresolved: what is the most
appropriate sentencing policy for individuals between eighteen and twentyfive years old, and should it be governed by the traditional standard or be
revised
to
incorporate
advancements
in
psychology
and
neuropsychology? 8 4 To answer this question, the legal community should
adopt a similar approach to the one adopted in 1923, and look to an
independent agency within the judicial branch that was specifically created
to evaluate and make recommendations on the most appropriate sentencing
policy-the United States Sentencing Commission.85

81 See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (explaining current assumptions necessary
to draw conclusions in neuroscience); see also notes 62-65 (showing two neuroscience experts
disagreeing on cutoff age of adolescents).
82 See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (presenting Second Circuit's reasoning for
rejecting district court's argument in favor of traditional standards). Besides more of the
population understanding and accepting the field of neuroscience, it is critical for the experts to
specify what terms are being used to evaluate the culpability of a legal adult; for instance, are we
examining adolescence, maturity, brain development, or psychological development? See C.R.,
792 F. Supp. 2d at 502. For example, when the court asked Dr. Steinberg to define adolescence,
he separated an individual's "development" into two parts: "[ilf you were doing it in terms of
brain development, I would say probably from about 10 to 24 . . . . If you were talking about
psychological development, I would say maybe from 10 to 20 [or] 10 to 21." Id. Therefore, it is
imperative to define how the courts should evaluate a person's maturity level or developmental
level in recommending an appropriate sentence. See id.
83 See supra note 76 (providing examples of cases utilizing arguments in Graham and
Miller). According to Nita Farahany, a bioethicist at Duke University, who has been following
the increase of neuroscience evidence in the United States, "the number of judicial opinions
mentioning neuroscience evidence tripled between 2005 and 2011, from roughly 100 to more
than 300." Greg Miller, Neuroscience is Getting Its Day in Court Whether It's Ready or Not,
WmiED (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2013/12/brain-science-law//.
84 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (identifying reasons why Supreme Court is
unlikely to confront this particular question).
85 See An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION 1, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/USSC Overview.pdf
(last visited November 14, 2014) [hereinafter Commission Overview] (outlining history and
purpose of Sentencing Commission). In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act,
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B. The Sentencing Commission's Role in the Next Phase of Juvenile Justice
The United States Sentencing Commission ("the Commission") has
the responsibility of evaluating the effects of Sentencing Guidelines within
the legal system, recommending to Congress appropriate modifications of
substantive criminal law and sentencing procedures, and establishing a
research and development program on sentencing issues.86 The Sentencing
Guidelines [the Guidelines] produced by the Commission are designed to:
"(1) incorporate the purposes of sentencing; (2) provide certainty and
fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing by avoiding unwarranted
disparity among offenders with similar characteristics convicted of similar
criminal conduct. . .and (3) reflect. . .advancement in the knowledge of
human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process.
Although

each of these objectives is applicable in some way to the sentencing issues
presented in United States v. Reingold, the third objective of the Guidelines
produced by the Commission is the most pertinent: to "reflect, to the extent
practicable, advancement in the knowledge of human behavior."88 To

which created the United States Sentencing Commission. See id. at 3. Congress established the
Sentencing Commission as an ongoing, independent agency to evaluate sentencing guidelines and
procedures. See id. The President appoints the seven voting members on the Sentencing
Commission, most of whom are federal judges, and once confirmed by the Senate, each member
serves a six-year term. See id.
86 See id. at 1-3 (explaining background of Commission). The Sentencing Commission was
instructed to "periodically ... review and revise [the guidelines] in consideration of comments
and data." Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Commission consults a
diverse range of agencies in promulgating federal sentencing policy, such as the United States
Probation System, the Bureau of Prisons, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the
Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice, and representatives of the Federal
Public Defenders. C.R., 792 F.Supp. 2d at 477.
87 Commission Overview, supra note 85, at 1. Over the past thirty-five years, judicial
discretion has been curtailed through legislative intervention. See Michael Fisher, Striking a
Balance: The Need to Temper JudicialDiscretionAgainst a Background of Legislative Interest in
FederalSentencing, 46 DuQ. L. REv. 65, 66 (2007) (questioning legitimacy of certain mandatory
minimum sentences). Along with providing recommendations to Congress, the Commission
created the Guidelines. Id. at 70. The Guidelines establish a base sentencing term period for each
crime in the federal U.S. Code, upon which an offender's sentence is calculated based on a
number of factors, including: the impact on the victim, the nature of the offender, his role in the
offense, any subsequent conduct on his part, and his past criminal history. Id. at 71. Unlike the
mandated minimums, however, sentencing judges are only required to consider the Guidelines in
sentencing hearings; they are not obligated to impose a sentence based on the Guidelines. See
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-60 (2005) (declaring sentencing guidelines
discretionary rather than mandatory).
88 See Commission Overview, supra note 85, at 1; see also supra Part III.A (discussing
advancements in neuroscience explaining human behavior). In C.R., the district court heard
experts offer neuroscience testimony that fundamentally questioned our assumptions about
human behavior. See CR., 792 F. Supp. 2d at 502; see also supra notes 61-64 and accompanying
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satisfy its primary objective of recommending the most appropriate
sentencing policy, the Commission should conduct a comprehensive
assessment of current evidence in the fields of psychology and
neuropsychology which implicates individuals eighteen or older.89
The Commission has conducted similarly comprehensive studies in
the past; two reports in particular address central concerns discussed by the
district court in United States v. C.R.90 Ini October 2011, the Commission

prepared a report, pursuant to a congressional directive, assessing the
impact of mandatory minimum penalties on federal sentencing. 91 In
evaluating mandatory minimum penalties, the Commission "reviewed
legislation, analyzed sentencing data . . . studied scholarly literature,
consulted with its advisory groups . . . and heard from social scientists,
scholars, and others who apply or study mandatory minimum sentencing
provisions. 92 In December 2012, the Commission independently initiated
text (explaining how monitoring brain activity helps explain impulse control in eighteen to
twenty-five year olds).
89 See C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d at 484-87 (explaining comprehensive study on controversial
mandatory minimums conducted by Sentencing Commission). One of the primary goals in
establishing the Sentencing Commission was to ensure a certain level of continuity and
consistency in similar offenses within the legal system. See Fisher, supra note 87, at 68-69
(discussing goals of sentencing reform). The issue between the district court and the Second
Circuit in Reingold, demonstrates a dispute that will only become more exhausted as
neuroscience technology develops. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text (explaining
approach taken by each court in defining adults). The United States Sentencing Commission has
conducted comprehensive studies in the past. to evaluate sentencing. See Erik Luna & Paul G.
Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOzO L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2010) (illustrating Commission's
purpose in conducting comprehensive evaluations of sentencing policy). When Attorney General
Eric Holder created a working group in 2010 to evaluate federal sentencing policy, Congress
immediately "directed the U.S. Sentencing Commission to submit a comprehensive report on
mandatory minimums... Id at 4.
90 See C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d at 478-84 (discussing controversial nature of mandatory
minimums and harsh child pornography sentences); see also Commission Overview, supra note

85 (listing recent testimony, reports, and submissions by Commission).
91 See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
IN
THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
(2011), available at
http://www.ussc .gov/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimumpenalties/report-congress-mandatory-minimum-penalties-federal-criminal-justice-system
[hereinafter Mandatory Minimum Penalties] (providing Commission's findings reported to
Congress).
92 See id. at xxv (Executive Summary) (providing Commission's overall conclusions and
recommendations). The Commission's report involved a detailed empirical study involving
73,239 cases from 2010, breaking down the impact of mandatory minimums by race, gender,
citizenship, criminal offense, rates of relief from mandatory minimums, and relief rates due to
defendants assisting the prosecution. See id. at xxvii (Executive Summary) (illustrating impact of
mandatory minimums on all demographics). By conducting such an expansive review,
approximately 370 pages not including the ten appendices, the Commission illustrated the
discrepancies and inconsistencies surrounding the current policy and provided Congress general
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another comprehensive report examining federal sentencing policy in child
This study highlights the impact of recent
pornography cases. 93
technological advancements that have completely changed the ways in
which individuals "receive" child pornography, and how these
advancements drastically affect the current sentencing policy. 94 These
Commission Reports provide in-depth analysis on the most controversial
legal issues conducted by a few of the most experienced and respected
judicial minds in the country - the advancements in psychology and
neuropsychology that question the distinction between juveniles and young
adults deserves their attention.95
In evaluating sentencing policy for young adults, the Commission
should begin their report with a similar approach as the Mandated
Minimums Report: studying scholarly literature; analyzing sentencing data
from individuals eighteen years old to those in their early twenties; and
hearing from experts in sociology, psychology, neuropsychology, and
neuroscience. 96 After outlining the current state of psychology and
neuropsychology, the Commission should apply its findings to the current
sentencing policy, as it did in the Federal Sentencing in Child Pornography

and specific recommendations for moving forward. See id. at 345-48 (Chapter 12) (presenting
Commission's general conclusions and recommendations).
93 See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: FEDERAL
CHILD

(2012), [hereinafter FederalChildPornographyOffenses] available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative and PublicAffairs/
CongressionalTestimonyand Reports/Sex OffenseTopics/201212_FederalChildPomograp
hy_Offenses/Full Report to Congress.pdf (outlining the Commission's full report to Congress).
This study cites neuroscience experts in discussing the potential treatment available to individuals
who view child pornography. See id at 278-79 (Chapter 10) (referencing neuroscience experts in
two footnotes). This report cites United States v. C.R. on seven separate occasions to illustrate
the complexities involved in sentencing child pornography defendants. See id. at 13, 16, 171,
173, 272, 286, 289 (Chapters 1, 7, 10) (presenting problems that arise in applying outdated
sentencing policy).
94 See id. at 1-3 (Chapter 1) (outlining purposes and methodology used by Commission).
The Commission points to the concerns voiced by "a number of stakeholders in the federal
criminal justice system .... to revise the sentencing scheme to reflect both the recent evolution of
offense conduct brought about by technological changes and also emerging social science
research . . .." See id. at 3.
Upon presenting their findings, the Commission ultimately
concluded that the sentencing scheme needed to be updated in order "to better reflect the
technological changes and new expert knowledge and also to account for current offenders'
varying degrees of culpability and dangerousness." See id.
95 See supra Part IV.A (identifying issue's unique circumstances making it difficult for
Supreme Court to make ruling); see also Shen, supra note 57, at 361 ("T]he 'legal system' spans
beyond courtrooms, and.., much of the work to be done happen[s] in Congress, state legislatures
and administrative agencies .... ).
96 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (addressing amount of resources consulted
by Commission in Mandatory Minimums Report).
PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES
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Cases.97 If the Commission concludes, as it did in that report, that the
current sentencing policy is outdated and needs to "better reflect the
technological changes and new expert knowledge," it should make
recommendations to Congress and make revisions to its Guidelines. 98 On
the other hand, if the Commission concludes that the evidence presented by
psychologists and neuropsychologists is not at a level to justify rejecting
the traditional adult age of eighteen, or restricting its use in mitigation, the
report still provides guidance to practicing attorneys and judges when
hearing these arguments. 99 The advancements in neuroscience have
already begun impacting different areas of the law, and its expanded use is
extremely likely. 100 The Commission's report would provide specific
guidance to Congress, as well as state and federal courts on how
neuropsychology has impacted the debate over the culpability of a young
adult; in doing so, the Commission's findings would also provide the
beginning of a broader debate over where neuroscience fits into evaluating
a defendant's conduct within the legal system.' 0'

97 See Federal Child Pornography Offenses, at 330-31 (Chapter 12) (presenting overall
conclusion and recommendations); see also supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (explaining
Commission's approach in evaluating current child pornography sentences). The Commission
presented a comprehensive report to Congress on an outdated policy that only affected one area of
criminal conduct. See supra notes 93-94. If the Commission was willing to spend that much
time on an outdated policy that only affects one offense, it should be willing to conduct a similar
report on an area of law that would affect every congressional mandatory minimum. See supra
notes 93-94.
98 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (citing Commission's child pornography

sentencing findings); see also Rebecca Krauss, Neuroscience and InstitutionalChoice in Federal

Sentencing Law, 120 YALE L.J. 367, 375 (2010) (explaining how neuroscience evidence could
better inform Commission Guidelines).
99 See supra note 76 (listing additional cases using this argument for defendants over age
eighteen); see also J.R.H. Law, Cherry-Picking Memories: Why Neuroimaging-Based Lie
Detection Requires A New Frameworkfor the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under FRE
702 and Daubert, 14 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1, 50 (2011) (cautioning admittance of neuroscience for

lie-detection purposes until better understood); Phillips, supra note 31, at 38-41 (providing
examples of attorneys using neuroimages as evidence in the courtroom).
100See supra Part III (explaining recent advancements in neuroscience and application in
courtroom); see also Betsy J. Gray, Neuroscience, PTSD, and Sentencing Mitigation, 34

L. REv. 53, 91-94 (2012) (considering use of neuroscience in sentencing defendants
diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)); Law, supra note 99, at 74-87
(illustrating courts' contradictory admission of functional neuroimaging to prove general but not
individual mental illness).
101 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text (discussing Commission Report's
comprehensive findings and recommendations); see also Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias,
Neuroscience, Free Will, Folk Intuitions, and the Criminal Law, 36 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 157,
173-74 (2011) (discussing philosophical shift necessary to redefine free will in legal system).
Although the traditional concept of free will in decision-making will continue to play a major role
in the administration of justice, "neuroscience and psychology have shown, and are likely to
CARDOZO
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V. CONCLUSION

Almost a century ago, a committee was formed with the express
purpose of providing recommendations to the states on how to administer
juvenile justice.
Endorsing a uniform set of standards to evaluate
individuals under eighteen by a different set of rules than "adults" had its
skeptics in 1923; neuropsychologists testifying to brain activity that effects
the maturity of a nineteen-year-old will be no different. Lawyers will
continue to be creative in utilizing these experts during trials and
sentencing hearings to show that the defendant's brain structure should be
considered as a mitigating factor. Although the defense attorneys were
ultimately unsuccessful in presenting such an argument to the Second
Circuit in US. v. Reingold, the result may have been different if they were
arguing to go outside of the sentencing guidelines minimum, rather than the
statutory minimum.
Twenty years ago, it was an accepted principle that a seventeenyear-old who commits a terrible act should be held accountable for his
actions, regardless of whether that was through execution or life in prison.
Today, both sentences are unconstitutional. The rapid expansions in the
field of neuroscience have led many experts to question our traditional
values surrounding behavior and culpability. However, given the historical
evolution of our current policy and the broad implications of reversing
Reingold, the Supreme Court is unlikely to grant certiorari or take action on
a similar case for many years. The unique role of the Sentencing
Commission, on the other hand, provides the legal system a separate
platform with which to evaluate the proper judicial response to this
relatively new science following the Supreme Court's decisions in Roper,
Graham, and Miller.
Does neuropsychology present sufficient evidence to define a new
age for an adult in the legal system; should the immaturity of a defendant's
brain be considered a mitigating factor in sentencing; or is this just another
example of a reckless generation that refuses to take responsibility for their
actions? These are the questions that will continue to be debated in the
courtroom, by the media, and in living rooms across the country. Clearly,
there is no definitive solution to these questions-as there rarely is in
psychology or the law-but the legal community has a duty to confront
these questions. The Sentencing Commission, similar to the Juvenile-Court

continue to show, that people's conscious reasoning and self-control play a less significant role in
their behavior than we tend to assume, and than the law seems to assume." See Nadelhoffer &
Nahmias, supra, at 175.
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Standards Committee in 1923, is the most appropriate vehicle to lay the
foundation for that conversation.
Scott Lenahan

